I was listening to Bill Craig’s address at the Saddleback Apologetics Conference held at Saddleback Church in California yesterday (the whole conference is available here) and he was talking about the Kalam Cosmological Argument. This would have to be one of the first, maybe actually the first, philosophical arguments for God’s existence that I heard some years ago, and it is very simple to remember and to trot out in conversations, so I thought I would post on it. My goal here is by no means a complete defence of this argument – such a thing has filled volumes in the past and is certainly unsuitable for a blog such as this (not to mention that its gets pretty complex pretty quickly). All I hope to achieve here is the presentation of the argument in its basic form to bring it to people’s attention, as I believe it has great merit. Where you go with it and the detail of your investigation into these premises I leave to you. This argument is attributed to Muslim philosopher al-Ghazali from the mid to late first millennium and it has been used by Muslims, Jews and Christians alike. It goes like this:
1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause;
2) The universe began to exist;
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause
The first premise seems to me to be so obviously true that it barely needs defending. After all, nobody believes that things can just pop into being uncaused out of nothing! Let me give you an example: if I turned up at work driving a Ferrari and told people that it just popped into existence, uncaused and out of nothing, in my driveway that morning no one would believe me, and nor should they! As Dr Craig says, were we to believe that things can pop into being uncased out of nothing then I should be concerned that a horse might pop into existence in my living room while I’m at work and be there all day defiling the carpet! People would say I was certifiable if I espoused such a view!
The second premise is the one that really attracts the most criticism. Since the 1920’s the belief in the eternality of the universe has been in decline, and since the theory of the big bang became the common model the modern models of an eternal universe have really been restricted to the halls of academia, failing to gain a widespread popularity and belief. The model that continues to account for the evidence and provides the best explanatory power is the standard big bang model. But here’s the rub – the big bang model has at its core a beginning to the universe! Thus the theory of the origin of the universe that seems best supported by the evidence and has failed to be dislodged from that post by a multitude of other theories over the past 60 years is the one that shows our second premise to be correct. (For a very detailed and complex treatment of the models that propose an eternal universe see Dr Craig’s collected works. Discussions can also be found on his website www.reasonablefaith.org.)
Therefore, our third premise follows logically and inescapably – the universe has a cause.
What can be inferred from this argument about that cause? It must transcend space and time since they both began at the big bang. Since it is not in time, it must therefore be changeless, and since it is not in space it must me immaterial, or non-physical. It must be unimaginably powerful since all that exists was created out of nothing, because before the big bang there was nothing out of which to create the universe. Finally, this being must be a personal one. There are two types of causes: firstly, you have event causation, that is, one event causing another. For example, the event of the temperature dropping below zero leads to the cause of water freezing. This could be thought of in terms of dominos - one falls which causes another to fall and so one. Secondly, you have agent causation. This is where an agent causes something to happen. For example, I decide to press a button on my keyboard (cause) that results in the letter appearing on the screen (event). Since the universe is not eternal, it could not have been brought about by event causation alone, and there must have been an agent who started the series of events, who chose to create the universe.
A.K.A. the God of monotheism.
12 comments:
Notice the wording of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. “1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause.”
I have added emphasis to drive a point. Unless very careful, one is likely to “deny the premise” - a logical fallacy - when arguing this point. Aristotle, though never identifying his argument as such, Thomas Aquinas and many others have proved themselves guilty of it, so I make this warning to you so that you do not.
In the statement, “The Universe must have a cause, for everything has a cause” (every bang has a banger) lies an inconsistency. Only the preferred answer (there is a god) is the exception to the statement. This begs the question. “Everything must have a beginning. God started it all” (Everything except God, of course.) You see the fallacy? Be careful you don’t say something like this. Not that it is really false, for God does NOT have a beginning, but as far as your logic is concerned, you must be clear.
Stating this in a wrong way is quick way to let a smart atheist know you don’t really know what you’re talking about. So make sure you begin this simple argument correctly, “Everything that begins to exist has a cause.” You are not saying that God ever began to exist, but if you misspeak, it is easy to be knocked into a position you don’t want to be. A losing one.
Someone may know the original (or famously Aquinian) fallacy and even speak up saying one of two things:
A) “If Everything has a cause, then who caused God?” Which is another argument all together, God being outside and independent of the universe and all that is in it, time and space. Remember, we said anything that has a beginning. The Universe can be shown to have one, whereas one cannot give proof for God either way. (See the latest post HERE).
B) “Who says the universe had a beginning? It has been here forever.” Now this argument is defeated by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Basically saying that within an isolated (often misspoken as “closed”) system, everything that is not in equilibrium winds down over time, that is, entropy increases until a maximum value of equilibrium is obtained. So, the fact there are any heat pockets, suns or your tea on the stove, in the universe may be proof that the universe has not been here for an eternity because in an eternity there is not beginning, middle or end and we would have already been here for an eternity and that equilibrium already would have been reached. The universe would be cold. Absolutely cold, motionless and lifeless. No tea either, sadly.
Isn't an implied premise of the Kalamic argument that there are things that don't begin? Otherwise, "that begins" is a meaningless qualifier and "everything that begins has a cause" says exactly the same thing as "everything has a cause." How do you justify that implied premise?
Vinny, I don’t think this needs justification. This objection is beside the point as one doesn’t need to believe in beginningless objects to be persuaded by the argument. The fact that the particular object in view (the universe) has a beginning means that the argument stands (at least in my opinion). The kind of cause is necessary to create the universe might turn out to be a beginingless one, but that says nothing against the force of the argument.
I am a bit fuzzy on all the details surrounding al-Ghazali’s reasons for developing this argument, but I believe he was trying to make an argument that shows the universe needs a cause, not that there are some things that have beginnings and some things that don’t. I think we might draw that inference from it, but he could just as easily say that the existence or not of beginningless objects is immaterial to the argument. So long as both premises are true the conclusion follows. However, Al-Ghazali and other monotheists would point to the eternal God as the only thing that has no beginning and therefore needs no cause.
Finally, how do you justify the implication you’ve made that there are no objects without beginnings?
If you don't believe in beginningless objects, then "everything that begins has a cause" means the exact same thing as "everything has a cause" and you run into the problem that Robin identified.
Ok, I guess I'm not sure what you're after...since I believe in beginingless objects (or at least one - God) I don't see the problem.
What I am getting at is that the existence of a beginningless object is a necessary premise to the Kalamic argument and it is also the conclusion of the argument. That's a logical no-no.
Oh I see. I disagree for three reasons.
Firstly, belief in a beginningless object is not necessary for belief in the first premise. A person need only apprehend that everything they see around them has a cause for its beginning to realise that things don’t cause themselves, and that the universe must also have a cause for its beginning. You don't need to believe in beginningless things to understand that.
Secondly, the conclusion to the argument is not "therefore beginningless objects exist" it is "therefore, the universe has a cause". Since this argument doesn't actually tell you what that cause is, that's outside its explanatory scope, it's up to us to infer the characteristics of the cause of the universe. It is only by asking "What could cause a universe to begin?" one finds their way to a beginningless being, and I did that above.
Thirdly, we only have two options here. Either the universe began to exist, or it has always existed. If you claim that belief in the first presupposes a belief in beginningless things, doesn’t the second as well? And if that is the case, then belief in beginningless things is built into both of the options we have, and therefore is not a problem. Or at least it’s a problem both positions have!
Not in the least. That is part of the point of stating the argument this way. Vinny, I assume, perhaps incorrectly,
forgive me if I'm wrong, that you are trying to bait someone into restating the argument to allow for your conclusion.
The argument states that that anything with a beginning must have a cause. It does not state whether God has a
beginning or not. You cannot argue suppositions here, and I'll get to why in a moment. One must disagree with the argument as it is: the argument stands, things that have a beginning must have a cause. This is simple so far. We know that all things in and of the universe must follow this clause. It is not stated as such though, so the conclusion is not bound by such clause.
For instance, if the argument were to say, "Everything in the universe has a beginning" then the conclusion could not be God because one assumes He stands outside of it and we would be guilty of fallacy.
Here, the argument stands firm, though Vinny is right, without careful wording it does fall prey to foul logic.
That being said, it is another argument, a much more complex one - and one that cannot be proved as such imperically (see latest post) - as to whether or not God is part of the universe. I suggest, as Dave does, to actually listen to the original Confernce speech. The Existence of God is a good one in that series.
As usual, I'm on the train and will correct mistakes I've
made when I sit down at my desk later.
Let’s consider a different premise:
All crows that are black have wings.
If all crows are black, then “all crows that are black” designates exactly the same set of things as “all crows.” The phrase “that are black” is superfluous. It is a meaningless qualifier because it does not actually limit the subject of the premise. The premise may be true, but it is misleading as it suggests that a crow having wings is somehow dependent on its blackness.
With that in mind:
David,
Your first point is interesting, but I am not sure whether it cures the problem or not. If “[a] person need only apprehend that everything they see around them has a cause for its beginning to realise that things don’t cause themselves,” why don’t you just say “everything has a cause”? There may be some justification in talking about the cause of the beginning of a thing, which is an event, rather than the cause of the thing itself, but I am not sure you have captured it.
I find your second point somewhat disingenuous. The Kalam Cosmological argument is an argument for the existence of God. It is true that the conclusion of the particular syllogism under discussion is “The universe has a cause,” but that syllogism is just a subpart of an overall argument whose conclusion is that the universe must have been caused by a beginningless God.
Regarding your third point, I am not sure that belief in a beginningless universe presupposes belief in beginningless things. Wouldn’t that be like saying belief in God presupposes belief in God? Nor am I claiming that belief that the universe began to exist necessitates a belief in things that don’t begin. That would be like saying that believing that crows are black necessitates a belief that there are non-black crows, which I think is nonsensical.
What I think I am claiming is that applying a qualifier such as “things that begin,” “crows that are black,” “fish that live in water,” to a set of things presupposes that there are members of the set that do not have that quality. Otherwise, there is no point to using the qualifier because it does not in fact narrow the set of things you are talking about.
Robin,
I am not trying to bait anyone into anything. I am arguing that the premise “Everything that begins has a cause” presupposes that there are things that don’t begin because otherwise the qualifier “that begins” is meaningless.
With all due respect, I think your insistence that the argument be accepted as it stands is silly. We always evaluate arguments by examining the unstated assumptions and presuppositions that underlie the argument. If there is a problem with an unstated presupposition, “careful wording” that disguises the presupposition doesn’t make the argument valid.
You have acknowledged that there is a problem with the argument that begins with the premise “Every thing has a cause.” If the qualifier “things that begin” does not change the set of things that are the subject of the premise, how can it possibly cure the problem?
Vinny, I understand your objection, but I guess I still fail to feel it is a valid criticism of the argument.
“There may be some justification in talking about the cause of the beginning of a thing, which is an event, rather than the cause of the thing itself”. Not all causes are events – some are caused by agents. This is the dichotomy of causation – either events or agents. As for why we don’t say ‘everything has a cause’ – the same reason al-Ghazali didn’t...God had no cause! How/why/when He came about lies outside this argument, because Monotheists believe He had no beginning, and therefore needed no cause. It seems perfectly reasonable to say the al-Ghazai worded his argument like this on purpose – but he was not trying to show the cause of God, just the universe.
Your second point (my second point? My point on your point about my second point? :) ) - This argument is designed to prove God’s existence, that is correct, but it is not necessary that you reach that conclusion. I imagine there have been people over the last 1500 years or so who have posited a different cause than God in an attempt to provide a natural solution rather than a supernatural one. I simply contend that the best cause is God, that no other cause has the same explanatory power as God.
“Regarding your third point, I am not sure that belief in a beginningless universe presupposes belief in beginningless things”. It seems to me that if you believe in a beginningless universe you must believe in at least one beginningless thing – the universe itself! So I stand by my point.
Finally, let me say again, I don’t feel that your argument is persuasive. It seems very simple to me that a person who was sitting around thinking about where things come from and why they are there could very easily realise that everything they see around them had a time when it did not exist and a time when it did, hence it had a beginning and needed a cause for that beginning, either event or agent. Since the universe has a beginning it must have a cause, either event or agent. So far this person needs no pre-existing belief in beginningless things to draw this conclusion. However, being believes in an eternal God, we add the qualifier “that begins to exist” to separate God out from the argument, but that does nothing to invalidate the premises. You still need to show that either the first two premises are factually incorrect or that the argument violates a logical law – and I don’t believe you have been able to do that.
This will be my final comment on this post, so I invite you to have the last word. Enjoy!
I fully agree that you add the qualifier because you believe in God. That is why I believe that you are using your conclusion as a premise in your argument.
Oh, SNAP! Nice one, Vinny!
Vinny's right, much of the debate so far has escaped this, but we just fell into an apriori fallacy there!
First, Vinny, there are things that seemingly do not have a beginning. Immaterial things, mind you, but they are real nonetheless. Mathematical principles, moral ideals, love, etc. Sentimental mishmash? Certainly the maths aren't. Transcendence!
Anyway, what I think Vinny is trying to say is that the whole concept of causation only applies to change in things not to existence itself. Hume and Russell both rightly pointed this out. Basically the point of the stick is this: the entire framework of cause and effect surely only applies within the universe - rather like Kant's suggestion (which doesn't hold much water anymore) that cause and effect are only the way people in their limited capabilities perceive the world, not its reality. That in no way defeats the argument though even if it did "hold water"; "explanation of cause is not justification of reason."
In the end, Kant's argument reminds us that, and Vinny, I think this is your point really (correct me if I'm wrong) that "to ask what caused something assumes a framework of time, but there is no such framework beyond the universe!" (David Wilkinson, God, time and Stephen Hawking
However, what Hawking and many others have shown, and what Dave and myself are saying as well, is that in view of modern science, particularly in regard to the detail and precision involved in the Big Bang, the transcendence of mathematics, the existence of consciousness, morality, etc, it appears that something transcendent - or as Einstein put it, "the presence of a superior reasoning power" - has caused it "all." What that is though is entirely outside scientific speculation. It is completely untestable by any scientific method before one billion of a trillionth of a second after the Big Kablooie. Einstein himself tried to introduce a "fudge factor" but later called that the greatest blunder of his scientific career (apparently because marrying one's first cousin doesn't count as a scientific blunder...)
As Dave points out, if one takes the absurd position of a beginning-less universe then one must be ready to account for, scientifically and philosophically, an eternal one. This has been shown to be "silly" because nothing within the material universe (as that is all we are now dealing with, given this postulate) can actually be infinite. One only needs rent a room in Hilbert's Hotel to think that through.
I think it is largely the "untestability" of the postulate that unnerves many people, and rightly so - "timordeiinitiumsapientiae" - but to say that that invalidates the answer is itself not a valid statement because the statement itself is not scientifically provable.
Metaphysical explanations for the universe cannot be, out of hand, disregarded.
Post a Comment